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Price Discovery and Trading after Hours: 
New Evidence from the World’s Largest Carbon Exchange 
 
Abstract 
We investigate the impact of after-hours trading on magnitude and timing of price discovery 
over the close-to-close period on the world‘s largest carbon trading platform, the European 
Climate Exchange (ECX). Low volume trading in carbon financial instruments can lead to 
relatively high levels of price discovery but the generated pricing has low efficiency levels. 
This is informed by the high levels of informed trades and low levels of liquidity trades. Our 
results show higher trading volume per minute and price efficiency for after-hours when 
compared with regular trading hours. As a result of higher proportion of informed trades, 
adverse selection costs for trades during the after-hours are significantly larger than those for 
trades during the regular trading-day.  
 
 
JEL Classifications: G13, G15, G18, G19  
 
Keywords: price discovery, information asymmetry, transaction costs, informational 
efficiency, carbon futures, climate change policy and regulation. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Technological advances in financial markets since the late 1980s altered the way 
equity markets operate and led to studies of stock market price discovery and its determinants 
(see among others Barclay et al., 1990; Flood et al., 1999; Chan et al., 1995b; Easley et al., 
1996; Easley et al., 1997). A particular consequence of these advances was the introduction 
of after-hours trading (AHT) and more specific price discovery work on this phenomenon 
followed. Barclay and Hendershott (2003) investigate the AHT periods of before market 
opens (BMO) and after market closes (AMC) on the Nasdaq, creating the first comprehensive 
insight into how these two periods contribute to price formation. Contributions to 
understanding BMO price discovery have also been made through analyses of non-executed 
orders and non-binding quotes prior to opening.  Madhavan and Panchapagesan  (2000) and 
                                                 

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Stoll and Whaley  (1990) analyse the impact that activities of professional traders have on the 
opening price on the NYSE. Biais et al. (1999) and Davies (2003) investigate the effect of 
non-binding BMO orders on the Paris Bourse and the Toronto Stock Exchange respectively.
1
 
Ciccotello  and Hatheway (2000) and Cao et al. (2000) examine the price discovery process 
by means of non-binding market maker quotes.  
More recently, He et al. (2009) investigate the efficiency of price discovery in a 24-
hour US treasury market showing that the overnight trading period is a more important 
component of the treasury price discovery process than previously thought. This is a clear 
departure from the findings of Barclay and Hendershott (2003) on contributions of overnight 
trades to price discovery.  Jiang et al.‘s (2012) analysis of AMC trading, price contributions 
and discovery after the release of firm earnings (during AHT), reaches the same conclusion 
as He et al. (2009). Confirming the influence of after hours trading, they find BMO and AMC 
periods contribute 36% and 60% of price discovery on announcement days despite 
comparatively low volumes (see also Greene and Watts, 1996). 
Our contribution to the existing literature on price discovery in AHT comes from an 
analysis of a unique market which exchanges traded carbon permits. The European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) is the world‘s first large experiment with an emission 
trading system for CO2 and it is being keenly watched by policy makers in other regions 
throughout the world. Its success or otherwise will be a factor in determining whether a 
global emissions trading scheme will be adopted as a mechanism for limiting Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions. Our findings on price discovering during the normal trading day and AHT 
periods will indicate EU-ETS market efficiency, and therefore inform the case for a market-
led approach to tackling global warming via the reduction of carbon emissions. Although a 
                                                 
1
 Biais et al. (1999) also show how these orders reflect learning in the market.  
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few other papers have investigated efficiency in the EU-ETS (see for example Joyeux and 
Milunovich, 2010; Montagnoli and de Vries, 2010),  this is the first study that investigates 
efficiency in the Kyoto commitment phase with respect to the intraday evolution of price 
discovery and trading activity.  
Our results reveal that more contracts are traded per minute in the AMC period than 
during the normal trading day. Using the Huang and Stoll (1997) spread decomposition 
model, we discover that higher levels of information asymmetry are present during the AMC 
period/hour than at any other interval/hour during the normal trading day. We also find 
evidence that contribution to price discovery is a function of liquidity. Less liquid contracts 
prove the highest contributors to price discovery, even though they are informationally 
inefficient. Our analysis of exchange traded permits thus corroborates the extant literature 
which suggests that small amounts of trading can generate disproportionate price discovery 
and that liquidity leads to informational efficiency. Also, as in other studies, the least traded 
instruments contribute the largest proportion of price discovery in the AMC. Our findings 
suggest that a mandatory cap and trading scheme such as the EU-ETS can run as an efficient 
market for carbon financial instruments and therefore is an efficient way of reducing carbon 
emissions. The success of the EU-ETS in efficiently reducing carbon emissions makes a valid 
case for the introduction of a global mandatory market-led approach to reducing carbon 
emissions.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section we provide 
the background to the study by discussing the EU-ETS mechanism and summarizing the 
literature on price discovery and transaction costs in the EU-ETS. Section 3 discusses our 
sample selection and describes the data. Section 4 reports our econometric methodology and 
the empirical findings, and finally section 5 concludes. 
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2. Background to Study 
2.1 THE EUROPEAN UNION EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME 
The EU-ETS was established in 2005 to achieve the EU‘s emissions reduction target 
under the Kyoto protocol and is the largest international cap and trade scheme by value. It 
currently covers about 11,500 installations in Europe. Its annual dollar volume of transactions 
has exceeded US$100 billion consistently since 2008. In 2010, it topped US$119.8 billion in 
value and currently drives about 97% of the global carbon market value (Linacre et al., 2011). 
The EU-ETS is divided into phases. Phase I ran between 2005 and 2007, it was essentially a 
trial phase in preparation for the Kyoto commitment phase (the so called Phase II). Phase II 
starting in 2008 and will run until 2012.  During this phase, the EU resolved to continue with 
the scheme even in the absence of a global agreement to curb emissions by adopting 
proposals for a third phase.  Phase III will run from 2013 to 2020. Table 1 outlines the major 
differences between the three phases (see also Daskalakis et al., 2011 for comprehensive 
policy and economic review of the EU-ETS). 
Emission permits (European Union Allowances – EUAs) are generated electronically 
as records on various national registries connected to the central hub: the Community 
Independent Transaction Log (CITL). Annually, in April, the installations are required to 
submit EUAs equivalent to their verified emissions for the preceding compliance year. 
Project based permits are allowed for submission as well but with strict limits
2
.  
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
Literature on price discovery and transaction costs on exchange traded permits using 
high frequency field data is scarce, especially for the European carbon futures markets. Most 
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 Project based permits include Certified Emission Reduction Units (CER) and Emission Reduction 
Units (ERU) from Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation (JI) respectively. 
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of the contributions in this area have been on upstream issues such as initial allocation of 
emission permits and market conception (Convery, 2009). 
Benz and Klar (2008) were the first to provide an analysis of price discovery in the 
European carbon futures market by investigating estimated transaction costs in Phase I (2005-
2007) of the EU-ETS using intraday data. Similarly, Rittler (2011) was the first to study price 
discovery and causality in the early part of Phase II of the EU-ETS. Benz and Klar (2008) 
focus on price leadership between two platforms (European Carbon Exchange (ECX) and 
NordPool) in the EU-ETS and Rittler (2011) on price leadership between two instruments 
(spot and futures contracts). While Benz and Klar (2008) conclude that the ECX leads price 
discovery, Rittler (2011) shows that futures contracts lead price discovery. Using a different 
methodology, Cason and Gangadharan (2011) conduct a laboratory examination of price 
discovery in linked emissions trading markets. They find improvements in price discovery 
and efficiency as a result of intermediation between linked markets. This is relevant to this 
study because the EU-ETS has already been linked to countries outside the EU (Iceland, 
Liechtenstein and Norway) and EUAs created by those countries are traded on the ECX 
platform
3
. 
There are several studies relating to Rittler (2011) in its examination of links between 
the spot and futures contracts. Uhrig-Homburg and Wagner (2007) employ daily data from 
Phase I to determine price discovery measures for both spot and futures.  The study concludes 
that futures lead the price discovery process. Daskalakis and Markellos (2009) and 
Daskalakis et al. (2009) explore the links between spot and futures by modelling EUA price 
dynamics using stochastic processes in Phase I. They find that inter-phase banking 
restrictions lead to inconsistencies in futures pricing during Phase I. Futures pricing only 
                                                 
3
 Linking in the context of the EU-ETS also refers to the acceptance of Kyoto project allowances in the 
EU-ETS. 
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conforms to the cost of carry model on intra-phase basis only. This conclusion is supported to 
some extent by Joyeux and Milunovich (2010) since they show that long-run links exist 
between spot and futures in Phase I. Mizrach and Otsubo (2011) examine the onset of price 
discovery on the Bluenext spot market in Paris and the ICE/ECX futures market in London, 
the two largest platforms in the EU-ETS. They report that about 90% of the price discovery 
in the EU-ETS takes place on the ECX. Their results which are based on data from Phase II 
of the EU-ETS confirms the results of Benz and Klar (2008) who employ data from Phase I 
of the scheme. Our study differs from the aforementioned studies in that we focus on 
efficiency in relation to the intraday evolution of price discovery and trading activity. Also 
recently, Frino et al. (2010) examine liquidity and transaction costs in the EU-ETS using 
intra-day data from the ECX, and Ibikunle et al. (2011) employ event study methodology 
with the market model and liquidity proxies to investigate liquidity and trading improvements 
arising from the transition to Phase II using daily data from the European Energy Exchange 
(EEX). Both studies concur that liquidity in the EU-ETS has advanced since the start of the 
second phase of the scheme.  
 
3.  Data 
3.1 THE TRADING ENVIRONMENT ON THE ECX 
Trading in physically delivered EUA futures commenced in April 2005. The contracts 
are offered on a quarterly expiry cycle (March, June, September and December) up to 
December 2014. Futures with annual (December) deliveries for up to 2020 were recently 
introduced. The underlying for each ECX EUA contract is 1,000 EUAs. The trading system 
is electronic and continuous, initiates at 7:00hrs and ends at 17:00hrs UK local time from 
Monday to Friday. In 2010, EUA carbon permits accounted for more than 84% of global 
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carbon market value. Of these, 73% are traded as futures contracts (see Kossoy and Ambrosi, 
2010; Linacre et al., 2011). The ECX platform is the market leader in EU-ETS exchange 
based carbon trading with more than 92% market share. Over-the-Counter (OTC) trades are 
sometimes registered on the platform to reduce counter-party risk. The December maturity 
contracts represent about 76% of daily transactions on the platform hence form the basis of 
our investigations. The global dominance of the ECX platform has attracted participants from 
beyond Europe. In 2009, about 15% of trade volume on the platform was from traders 
domiciled in the United States (Kossoy and Ambrosi, 2010). 
Carbon Financial Instruments (CFI) trading in the ECX is done electronically and 
anonymously on the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) platform. Executed orders go through 
the Trade Registration System (TRS) for account allocation.  
There is a pre-open trading period of 15 minutes to allow participants place early 
orders in preparation for the trading day
4
. When trading closes at 17:00hrs no officially 
sanctioned trade is no longer allowed; however allowance is provided for registering of 
Exchange for Physical (EFP) and Exchange for Swaps (EFS) trades
5
. This can be reported 
using an electronic facility called the Iceblock on the platform. The Exchange officially 
requests that these trades be registered up to 30 minutes after the close of official trading each 
trading day except for the day of expiration of the traded contract. Reporting of EFP/EFS 
trades on the exchange however occurs up until about 6:00pm regularly on the days covered 
by our sample
6
. They are essentially bilateral trades that in theory require no market maker 
quotes to execute. 
                                                 
4
 This 15-minute period on the ECX platform recorded few executed orders over the ten-month period 
covered by our data in 2009 (February-November), only 12 trades with a combined contract volume of 700 were 
recorded on the exchange. The dates, times and corresponding volumes are available on request. 
5
 EFP and EFS trades are only permitted for EUA and CER Futures contracts. 
6
 This extension of registration period for EFP and EFS trades is acknowledged by ECX. 
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The buyer who charges the trade to the seller usually registers the trades. The seller 
then matches the trade by confirming it (Non-crossed Trade). It is possible for prices of EFP 
and EFS trades during the AMC period to fall outside the high and low points in the normal 
trading day (or beyond the biggest price shift from the previous close‘s settlement price) 
since the prices are not revealed until after the close. However, this requires approval from 
the ECX Futures Europe Compliance Department prior to registration. The maximum price 
movement however is still pegged at €1.00. 
 
3.2 SAMPLE SELECTION 
We use two datasets, both obtained from ICE Data LLP, for our analysis. The first, 
which is the main dataset we use, comprises of all intra-day tick-by-tick ECX EUA Futures 
contracts trades on the ECX platform from February 2009 through November 2009. The 
dataset contains date, timestamp, market identifier, product description, traded month, order 
identifier, trade sign (bid/offer), traded price, quantity traded, parent identifier and trade type. 
The variables are for 15 carbon financial instruments (CFI) (futures contracts and futures 
spreads).  
The second dataset is the end of day (EOD) data for ECX Futures from February 2009 
through November 2009. From here, we obtain the daily settlement price, daily low price, 
daily high price, and daily first price. We also extract daily volume (for all trade types) and 
daily weighted average price. This dataset does not contain any records for futures contract 
spreads, which are present in the first dataset.  
 In order to improve the robustness of our findings, we eliminate 11 of the CFI 
available by applying the following conditions:  
 
10 
 
1. Both datasets must provide trading records from February 2009 through November 
2009 for the selected CFI.  
2. As the analysis is based on the comparison of normal trading day to AMC, the CFI 
must be tradable during both periods in an EFP or EFS trade. 
3. The CFI must also be traded for at least 20% of days during both periods between 
February and November, 2009.  
 
The ECX tick dataset includes the trade sign identifier, hence we could identify the 
trades as buyer or seller initiated. For the AMC trades however, the challenge is that all trades 
are identified as buyer initiated by default since the trades are usually registered by the buyer 
who then alleges it to a seller. This is misleading; hence to overcome this problem, we use the 
tick test for classifying the trades
7
. We classify trades at a price greater than the prevailing 
trade midpoint as buyer initiated and those at a price lower than the prevailing midpoint as 
seller initiated. If the current and the previous trades are the same price we classify using the 
next previous trade. Analysis of the tick rule by Lee and Ready (1991) and Aitken and Frino 
(1996) suggest the tick rule‘s accuracy to be in excess of 90%. Aitken and Frino (1996) 
however suggest a lower accuracy level of 74% in some cases. Finally, we exclude the 12 
trades recorded before 7:00hrs London time in the sample.  
 
3.3 SAMPLE DESCRIPTION 
The ECX platform is the only exchange where official AMC trading is recorded in the 
EU-ETS and the trading is quite thin, averaging approximately 61 trades and 2,675 contracts 
per day. The contracts in our sample represent about 99% of total AMC trades recorded on 
                                                 
7
 For robustness we compare results based on tick test and actual identifier codes for the normal trading 
day trades.  The results are substantially the same. 
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the platform between February and November 2009. Trading in the EU-ETS in comparison to 
more established financial and commodities derivatives markets, is also thin. AMC trades 
averaged €37 million in value per day or 17% of the normal trading day‘s value between 
February and November 2009
8
.  AMC recorded trading is limited to between 17:00 and 18:00 
hours GMT.  
In Table 2 we report on normal trading day and AMC trading activity. Our results 
show daily average estimates for individual contracts and the full sample averages per 
contract per day. The trading volume is skewed towards one contract (December 2009) 
throughout the 211 days covered by our study. About 83% of the AMC trades in our sample 
are for the December 2009 contract. This is not unusual in the EU-ETS. Ibikunle et al. (2011) 
report that the December contract with the closest maturity date is the most actively traded on 
the platform. Joyeux and Milunovich (2010) as well as Mizrach and Otsubo (2011) also 
report the same phenomenon for the ECX. 
The most traded contract, the December 2009, averages 50 AMC trades per day (with 
a market value of approximately €26 million per day), while the other three contracts in our 
sample account for an average of ten trades (worth approximately €10.73 million) per day. 
Trading activity for the lower trading contracts shows a steep fall to an average of about 7 
contracts per day for the closest trading one (December-2010) to the December-09 contract
9
. 
                                                 
8
 As noted by Porter and Weaver (1998), large transactions executed on the Nasdaq were posted late 
(after-hours) after having been trading during the normal trading day. This does not hold for our sample as the 
trading system is electronic and the participants have real time access to input their trades at anytime during the 
normal trading day. 
 
9
 The highest trading instrument not included is the December-2013 futures contract. It has an average 
of less than 0.12 trades recorded AMC and 1.09 during normal trading hours, for the period covered by this 
dataset there are only 258 trades. As a result of this extremely low level of market activity, we do not include the 
contract and others with lower trading AMC activity in the analysis.  
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[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
4. Results and Discussion 
4.1 TRADING VOLUME AND VOLATILITY 
Figure 1 depicts for each half-hour interval, the average daily trading volume and 
average return volatility. Trading on the ECX displays an inverted S-shape rather than the 
familiar U-shape identified with derivative markets (see for example Chan et al., 1995a; 
Gwilym et al., 1997). Also in a clear contrast to previous studies, the most active period 
during the normal trading day is not the opening period. The closing stages of the normal 
trading day and the one hour AMC period are the most active periods on the ECX with 
respect to trading volume. Indeed, the largest Euro volume of trades per half-hour is recorded 
in the first half hour of AMC trading. This volume then holds steady for the concluding half-
hour of the AMC trading period shedding only about 11.62% of volume from the preceding 
half-hour period. Volatility and trading volume display high levels of correlation (Spearman‘s 
Rank Correlation Coefficient of 0.74)
10
.   
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
While the AMC trading volume on the ECX platform is inconsistent with previous 
studies (see for example Barclay and Hendershott, 2003), larger AMC mean and median 
trade values are consistent with them. Figure 2, shows log-transformations of median and 
mean trade sizes at one-minute intervals
11
. We observe a very steep rise in the mean and 
median sizes of trades after the close as expected. Figure 2 shows the mean estimates 
quadruple in the first minute of AMC trading and then peak at almost €955,000 on 17:07hrs. 
                                                 
10
 Volatility was estimated using the December 2009 contract only due to large gaps in trading cycle of 
other contracts. We also calculated volatility using the other contracts but excluded the gap periods. The results 
are similar. 
11
 These are plotted on a log scale because of the large variability of the trade sizes after-hours. 
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Trading values during the remainder of the session hold up competently. The final minute of 
trading has a mean value of nearly €600,000 which is almost twice the highest mean estimate 
at any point during the normal trading day. 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
4.2 MOTIVATION FOR TRADING AMC: LIQUIDITY OR INFORMATION? 
Platform rules governing the registration of EFP/EFS trades on the ECX during the 
normal trading day and the AMC are basically the same. Trading in the AMC is however 
open only to members with access to the Iceblock facility. Platform membership is usually 
for professional traders. Based on this, it is expected that the market at that time will be 
primarily composed of professional traders or traders acting on behalf of their clients. The 
question then arises, why leave it that late? Why is the largest value of trading per minute 
reserved for this period of the day? EFP and EFS trades can be reported at anytime of the day 
with less of the time constraint that is the one-hour AMC market. 
Microstructure studies identify two main types of traders, both holding idiosyncratic 
risks: the first type trades in search of liquidity, their aim is inventory control and portfolio 
rebalancing (especially at the end of the normal trading day). The second type trades on 
private information unknown at the time of trading to majority of the market. Since 
participation in the market is motivated by different reasons, we suppose these two classes of 
traders will have varying degrees of activeness in the AMC session.  
According to market microstructure literature, information asymmetry and uncertainty 
over fundamentals usually decrease over the course of a trading day
12
 (see Kyle, 1985; 
Madhavan et al., 1997; Foster and Viswanathan, 1990; Easley and O'Hara, 1992; Easley et al., 
1997; Huang and Stoll, 1997). Barclay and Hendershott (2003) note that public and private 
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 Madhavan et al. (1997) also find that trading costs increase as the normal trading day progresses. 
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information accrue overnight when no trading takes place. Indeed, for the ECX there is a 
non-trading interval of 12 hours and 45 minutes between the end of the AMC market and the 
15 minute pre-open at 6:45hrs London local time. This interval is longer than the 11-hour 15- 
minute combined trading period afforded by the platform. It is reasonable to assume that 
carbon market information could have accumulated during the no-trading period; hence we 
expect high information asymmetry in the early trading period and expect this to decline 
during the day. 
Further, the EU-ETS is an unusual market with many twists and turns fuelled by the 
controversy that surrounds climate change science. Many trades aim to offset emissions by 
market participants and so are based on information on anticipated levels of emission. 
Emissions are ultimately determined by installation production levels, and so we expect the 
AMC period to be dominated by informed trades and the more informed of these trades are 
likely to be in the later maturity contracts. 
Emission permits are not submitted year-round to offset verified emissions positions, 
therefore trades could also be based on risk hedging and portfolio diversification. If emission 
permits are for submission to the authorities once a year, it is logical to expect that AMC 
trading is not an absolute necessity unless there is an advantage to be earned. Uhrig-Homburg 
and Wagner (2009) argue along these lines in a study investigating the EUA spot and futures 
relationship.  Much more importantly, the size of the typical EFP/ EFS trades in our sample 
suggests that these trades will be mainly initiated by institutional and compliance traders who 
are clearing members of the exchange. Kurov (2008) finds evidence that institutional traders 
in index futures markets are more informed than other classes of market participants. These 
reasons lead us to expect larger spreads and higher levels of informed trading during the 
15 
 
AMC
13
 than the normal trading day. Previous studies have also shown there is higher 
informed trading during AMC than during normal trading day (see for example Barclay and 
Hendershott, 2003). 
The motivation for trades in search of liquidity will be different to the motivation for 
trades influenced by privately held information. According to Brock and Kleidon (1992), 
being in possession of a sub-prime portfolio overnight comes at higher costs in comparison 
with holding an optimal one. This provides a strong motivation for market participants who 
could not complete the optimal balancing of their portfolio during the regular hours to trade 
in the AMC period. On the ECX, the EFP and EFS trades offer this opportunity. 
In addition to expecting higher informed trades in the AMC, we also expect that the 
first few hours of the normal trading day will exhibit higher information asymmetry than 
other periods during the normal trading day. This is as a result of the information 
accumulation we expect to have occurred during the non-trading period overnight. As a result 
of reduced number of individual trades (see Table 2), perhaps due to the reduced number of 
participants trading in the AMC period, we also expect larger spreads than at any interval 
during the normal trading day during the AMC period. The superior euro value and contract 
sizes of the trades in the AMC (Figures 1 and 2) suggest that a substantial proportion of the 
trades are information-induced hence there will be the imposition of larger spreads in order to 
compensate for risk of trading with in this period. 
We now examine the hypothesis that there is a higher level of informed trading and 
larger spreads during the AMC trading hour than at any other period during the day by 
estimating adverse selection components and one-half effective spreads at different intervals 
                                                 
13
 Reasons already identified for the EFP and EFS trades may not suffice here as the trades could easily 
be executed during the normal trading day. 
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during the day and during the AMC period by using Huang and Stoll‘s (1997) spread 
decomposition model.   
The model decomposes the bid-ask spread into the adverse selection and inventory 
cost components by using buying and selling pressure. The technique is based on the fact that 
changes in quotes due to inventory are not just dependent on inventory changes in one 
financial instrument but others as well (induced serial correlation in trade flows). Huang and 
Stoll (1997) assume that adverse information is instrument specific but inventory effects are 
idiosyncratic (in relation to the portfolio held by market participants)
14
. This model has been 
established by other market microstructure studies (see among others Van Ness et al., 2001; 
Heflin and Shaw, 2000)
15
. 
We estimate Equation (1) for each contract and each interval separately using the 
ordinary least squares and time series regression as adopted by Heflin and Shaw (2000)
16
. 
 
                             

Pk,t  1,kQk,t 2,kQk,t1 3,kQA,t1 et          (1)                                          
                                                 
14
This approach models market participants as adopting a portfolio view when executing inventory 
modification of stocks. It is hinged on the Ho and Stoll (1983) model that shows the connection between quote 
shifts in a stock and inventory changes other stocks. The authors prove that the quote shifts in stock a which is 
in reaction to a transaction in stock b is contingent on cov(Ra, Rb)/σ
2
(Rb).  
15
 Van Ness et al. (2001) suggest that the Huang and Stoll (1997) model is superior to other commonly 
used models in measuring adverse selection information costs. However, the ―superiority‖ of the model has its 
costs. Some authors have reported the possibility of obtaining implausible estimates from the model estimation 
when using the probability of trade reversal approach in place of trading pressure approach. For example Clarke 
and Shastri (2000) report this problem analysing a sample of 320 NYSE firms, indeed Van Ness et al. (2001) 
also report similar issues. It seems that there is a correlation between low probability of trade reversal and the 
implausible estimates. For this paper we report only the trade aggregator estimation and there is no evidence of 
this problem since our estimates are comparable to those of Benz and Klar (2008) estimated using the Madhavan 
et al. (1997) model.  
16
 Huang and Stoll (1997) point out that the cross-sectional estimation of Equation (1) usually over-
estimates the adverse selection costs component of the spread. By adopting a time series estimation of Equation 
(1) for each contract we avoid this issue. 
17 
 
 
Where 

Pk,t  is the change in price from the previous retained trade, 

Qk,t  is equal to 1 
(-1) when the transaction at period t for contract k is a sell (buy) and 

QA,t1 is the aggregate 
buy-sell indicator variable used in encapsulating portfolio trading pressure on market 
participants inventory levels. It is measured as: 

QA ,t1 1 for Qk,t1  0
k1
n

QA ,t1  1 for Qk,t1  0
k1
n

QA ,t1  0 for Qk,t1  0
k1
n

 
Where n is the number of contracts in our sample trading during that interval. 
 
We follow Huang and Stoll (1997) in employing only the last trade at every five-
minute interval to formulate the variables in equation (1)
17
. Huang and Stoll (1997) observe 
that large trades are sometimes broken up and registered as smaller trades. To counter the 
problems that may arise from this, they employ a ―bunching‖ technique whereby trades 
occurring within five minute intervals of each other executed at the same price and with same 
quotes are bunched together and regarded as one trade. The results obtained by Huang and 
Stoll (1997) from the bunching technique suggest that the method increases the adverse 
selection component estimates
18
. As devised in Equation (1), the 

1,k estimate is one-half the 
                                                 
17
For the normal trading day, we estimate equation (1) using the trade classification provided by ECX 
in our dataset and also by employing the tick rule (Lee and Ready, 1991). The empirical estimates from both 
methods show quantitatively similar results and return a correlation coefficient in excess of 0.97. We therefore 
employ the results based on the tick rule in our results for both normal trading day and AMC periods. 
18
 We also employ an estimated trade reversal probability in place of the aggregate buy/sell indicator 
but as is evident in the results of Huang and Stoll (1997), the method is disposed to giving negative adverse 
selection components. We do not report the estimates from this method but instead use the aggregate indicator.  
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estimated effective spread and, the adverse selection component is equivalent to

2(2,k 1,k) . 
We use the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test for obtaining statistical inference on the level of 
differences between normal trading day intervals and the AMC period. 
In Panel A of Table 3, we report the estimated adverse selection costs components of 
the effective spread for each contract and time interval as well as the combined contracts 
average. The results largely support the hypothesis on reducing information asymmetry over 
the course of the normal trading day. In the normal trading day, information asymmetry is 
highest in earlier intervals. Overall, it is highest between 7:00hrs and 11:00hrs than at any 
interval during the rest of trading day. As expected there is a high level of information 
asymmetry after the close to support the suggestion that those who trade in this market do so 
based on private information. Our results are also consistent with earlier studies finding 
higher levels of informed trading in the AMC period than during the normal trading day (see 
Barclay and Hendershott, 2003; He et al., 2009; Jiang et al., 2012). The average adverse 
selection spread component for all contracts during the AMC is almost 12 times the value for 
the normal trading day (07:00-17:00). This implies that participants are significantly more 
likely to trade with private information in the AMC market than during the normal trading 
day. Although the investigations on information asymmetry is conducted in a relatively less 
active and quite unusual market, our adverse selection costs and one-half effective spread 
estimates in the normal trading day period are comparable to estimates from most previous 
studies (see among others Heflin and Shaw, 2000; Huang and Stoll, 1997; Madhavan et al., 
1997; Lin et al., 1995; George et al., 1991; Glosten and Harris, 1988). 
In Panel B, we present the one-half effective spread estimates. The results confirm our 
hypothesis that spreads are wider in the AMC period than in the normal trading day. The 
results in the normal trading day are also comparable to the results obtained by Benz and Klar 
(2008) using the Madhavan et al. (1997) model to estimate half spread in the ECX during 
19 
 
Phase I of the EU-ETS. All the one-half effective bid-ask spread estimates are statistically 
significant at all conventional levels, with the exception of the December-2012 contract. 
Spreads are generally higher during the first two hours of trading than at any other period 
during the normal trading day.  
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
4.3 PRICE DISCOVERY; INFORMATION ABSORPTION ON THE ECX 
It is established in the literature that price discovery is a function of trading activity; 
(see among others Jiang et al., 2012; Pascual et al., 2004; Kim et al., 1999; French and Roll, 
1986). In sub-section 4.2 we demonstrate that information asymmetry is higher during AMC 
session than during the normal trading day. We also show that spreads grow larger in the 
AMC period as well. This implies that there should be a higher proportion of price discovery 
per hour taking place during the AMC. Results obtained during the open-close period by 
Barclay and Hendershott (2003) suggest that the least trading instruments contribute the 
higher proportion of price discovery during the regular trading hours. In Table 2 we show that 
the December-2011 and December-2012 contracts are the least trading, we therefore expect 
that they will contribute the highest ratio of price discovery during the normal trading period. 
We thus examine this and the relatedness of the distribution of informed trading to price 
discovery in this sub-section using two price contribution measures: The weighted price 
contribution (WPC) and the weighted price contribution per trade (WPCT).  
 
4.3.a Weighted Price Contribution 
We use the WPC established by previous studies (see for example van Bommel, 2011; 
Cao et al., 2000; Barclay et al., 1990; Barclay and Hendershott, 2004; Barclay and Warner, 
20 
 
1993)
19
 as our measure of price discovery. We compute the contribution of different EUA 
futures contracts to the price discovery process during five intervals of the normal trading day 
and the one hour AMC period. We also include in our measurements the estimates for the 
entire normal trading day period (07:00-17:00hrs London local time). The terminal period for 
the normal trading day is the last trade at or before 17:00:00hrs and the AMC period as the 
first trade after 17:00:00hrs. The WPC measure we use estimates the proportion of the 24-
hour (close-close) EUA contract price return that takes place at that period. 
 
For each contract, we define the WPC for each 24 hour period and each period k as: 
 
     

WPCk,c 
retc
retcc1
C







retk,c
retc                            (2) 
 
Where 

retc  is the close-to-close return for contract c and 

retk,c is the log-return for 
period k and for contract c. The intuition behind the WPC is that 

retk,c
retc
 is measure of relative 
proportion of the day‘s return provided by contract c and 

retc
retcc1
C

 is the weighing factor for 
each contract. It ensures that values with smaller 

retc  are given small weight. Thus, we 
compute WPC for each contract and each interval, then average across days to obtain the 
WPC for each contract-specific interval. We also report the WPC across all the contracts. 
This is defined as: 

WPCk 
retc
retcc1
C









c1
C
 
retk,c
retc





,            (3) 
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 van Bommel (2011) analyse three estimators of price discovery and identifies the WPC as consistent.  
It is also the only unbiased and asymptotically normal measure for price discovery. 
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Normally the WPC is computed instrument by instrument and then averaged out 
across the instruments (see Cao et al., 2000). When this is the case however, instrument 
correlations generated by the common constituent in the returns makes statistical inferences a 
complex affair using the mean WPC. Since we report WPC individually for each contract we 
need not be concerned about this; we thus employ the standard t-statistic to test the null that 
the daily WPC values (per period and for each contract) are not significantly different from 
zero. We also use the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test for obtaining statistical inference on the 
level of differences between normal trading day intervals and the AMC period. 
Table 4 shows the WPC estimates for the 24-hour (close-to-close). The results show 
that the most liquid contract (December-2009) contributes the least to price discovery over 
the entire trading periods. Results in Table 4 also confirm that the December-2012 and the 
December-2011 contracts are the two highest contributors to price discovery over all the 
trading periods (55% and 31% respectively). Together they account for 86% of total price 
discovery over the entire periods. Their contributions over the combined normal trading day 
period (07:00-17:00hrs) and the AMC period are statistically significant. This is not 
surprising because EU-ETS trading, as explained in section 2, is dependent on information 
relating to emission levels, political and regulatory shifts on environmental legislations and 
global treaties. In this context, the likely primary motivation for taking a position on a 
contract with maturity about three years away is possession of information that this is a good 
move either for hedging or otherwise. The distribution of price discovery also correspond to 
that of information asymmetry (Table 3), confirming that the contracts with the largest 
adverse selection costs and trading spreads contribute the higher proportion of price 
discovery in a market. Overall, most of the price discovery takes place during the normal 
trading day over a 10-hour period. However more than a quarter of the price discovery occurs 
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during the space of just one hour (17:00hrs-18:00hrs) in the AMC trading period, despite 
reduced number of executed trades.  
Another important observation is that more than 21% of the total close-close price 
discovery occurs in the first two hours (07:00hrs-09:00hrs) of the normal trading day. This is 
interesting considering the fact that only about 18.9% volume of trades for all intervals occur 
during this period. Moreover, more than 88.13% of these trades are in the December-2009 
contract which by the way, contributes nothing to price discovery during that period. 
Effectively, only about 16.65% of the 62,872 trades taking place at this time in our sample 
hold significant price information. This explains why the WPC value is not significantly 
different from zero. This trend is consistent with the one discussed in sub-section 4.2. The 
hypothesis that there is an accumulation of information during the non-trading 13.5-hour 
period therefore holds for the later maturity contracts. Based on this we expect individual 
trades in the opening period to contribute more to price discovery than at any other period 
during normal trading day. Our expectation here does not include the AMC because although 
the period enjoys the highest euro volume per minute of trade, the aggregate number of trades 
is vastly inferior to those in the normal trading day making the trades in the AMC potentially 
more informative than those in the opening period. We test this hypothesis in sub-section 
4.3.b below. We must point out that price discovery estimates in the 15:00-17:00 period are 
quantitatively similar to the morning period‘s and are statically significant. This is down to 
the rising level of EFP/EFS trades during this period (also seen in Figure 1). As the normal 
trading day draws to a close, traders start to push their trades in order to ensure their 
portfolios attain optimal status or to avoid trading with the potentially well informed traders 
in the AMC.  
We observe that the lowest average WPC during the periods is recorded during the 
11:00-13:00hrs range. In Figure 1, this period has the highest volatility relative to trading 
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volume. The high volatility and low WPC raises the suggestion of noisiness during the 
normal trading day. In sub-section 4.4, this issue will be examined closely by analysing the 
efficiency of the price discovery process. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
4.3.b Weighted Price Contribution per Trade  
The high WPC estimate recorded for the first two hours (07:00-09:00hrs) of the 
normal trading day coupled with the level of trading in comparison with the other normal 
trading day intervals provide the basis to expect high information content per trade for the 
later maturity contracts. This is because the bulk of the price discovery reported for the 
07:00-09:00hrs period is contributed by them. And since they only account for 17% of the 
trades during the period, the price discovery per trade values for their individual trades are 
expected to be significant. The adverse selection component is also highest during this period 
for the normal trading day. We therefore proceed to examine the information content per 
trade using the WPCT measure. We divide the WPC per contract and for each trading interval 
with the weighted ratio of trades executed for that contract and during that period. If for each 
day, 

tk,c  is the number of executed trades in time period k for contract c, and 

tc  is the total 
sum of 

tk,c  for all the periods, then 

WPCTk  is defined as 
 
                                             

WPCTk,c 
retc
retcc1
C







retk,c
retc 
retc
retcc1
C







tk,c
tc 
                      (4)                                         
 
As a consequence of the measure outlined in equation (4) being equivalent to a ratio 
of the aggregate price shift occurring in an interval scaled by the ratio of trades in that same 
interval, the WPCT should be about one. This holds only if we assume that all trades carry 
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similar levels of information to the market. We report the WPCT close-to-close price shift in 
Table 5. For statistical inference, we use the standard t-statistic to test the null that the daily 
WPCT values (per period and for each contract) are not significantly different from zero. We 
also use the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test for obtaining statistical inference on the level of 
differences between normal trading day intervals and the AMC period.   
Our results show that for three of the contracts, the trades in the opening period hold 
higher levels of information than at any time during the normal trading periods. Some of the 
estimates for the normal trading day are noisy as they are not statistically significant. 
Consistent with Panel A of Table 3 and Table 4, on per contract basis, the contract with the 
farthest maturity, the December-2012 contract holds the highest level of information per trade. 
We also observe individual trades in the period 15:00hrs-17:00hrs are very informative and 
are largely statistically significant across all contracts. This corresponds to WPC estimates in 
Table 4 being high and significant during this interval. The informed trading effect of the 
increasing EFP/EFS trades at this period is therefore more evident as the proportion of 
liquidity-seeking trades during the normal trading hours start to taper off. This implies that 
the level of price discovery reported for this period will have a level of efficiency comparable 
to that of the AMC period; we examine this in sub-section 4.4. The results in sub-section 4.3 
(Tables 4 and 5) thus confirm that the AMC, the opening two hours and the two hours prior 
to closing are very important in the price discovery process. 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
 
4.4 EFFICIENCY OF PRICE DISCOVERY: ANALYSIS BY PERIOD 
In markets with relatively low trading volumes like the EU-ETS platforms, big 
liquidity induced trades usually lead to short term price effects that are afterwards reversed. 
This is because large trades are commonly considered as being information-driven. Although, 
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on per minute basis, the highest proportion of large contract trades are in the AMC; results 
shown so far suggest there is a higher proportion of liquidity-driven trades in the normal 
trading day than in the AMC. Based on this we expect the normal trading day trades to be 
generally noisier than the AMC trades because of price reversals.  
 However, since large spreads, as shown in Panel B of Table 3 for the AMC period, 
are typically instrumental to price reversals, we also suspect there may be an appreciable 
level of noisy trades in the AMC. Hence our hypothesis here is for lower signal: noise ratio 
for the normal trading day than the AMC. Based on foregoing analysis, we also expect the 
December-2011 and December-2012 (the most illiquid instruments in our sample) to 
generally have low signal: noise ratio, implying high noise levels across all periods. In sub-
section 4.3, we observe that the high volatility levels and low WPC estimates around the 
11:00-13:00hrs interval indicates noisy trades; hence we expect the lowest signal: noise ratio 
estimates in the normal trading day for this interval. 
We measure price efficiency by using the so-called unbiasedness regressions (as 
shown in equation 5) to estimate the noisiness of contracts‘ prices for different intervals 
(Biais et al., 1999).  
                                               

retcc  retck k                                        (5)                                                    
 
For each contract and each day equation (5) is estimated separately for each time 
interval (60 minutes each for the normal trading day and 10 minutes for the AMC), where 

retcc  is the close-to-close return and 

retck  is the return from the close to the end time of 
interval k.  
Barclay and Hendershott (2003) argue that the slope coefficient 

 is a measure of 
signal: noise ratio of trades. Reviewing the regression analysis problem of standard errors-in-
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variables, assuming contracts returns are accurately computed and they are not correlated, the 
slope coefficient will equal one. Then take the assumption that the actual return is not 
observed and also that the observable return is actually equivalent to the real return plus the 
noise. Noise in this sense refers to microstructure impacts such as spread components or 
reversible price effects. If we imagine that 

retcc  RETcc v  and

retck  RETck  u , then we 
can consider 

RETcc  and 

RETck  as the actual returns and that 

u  and 

v  have zero mean and 
respective variances equivalent to 2
u  and
2
v . An ordinary least squares estimation of 
Equation (4) will result in the estimated slope coefficient 

*, where  
 

*
p
 
RETck
2
RETck
2 u
2





   
 

RETck
2  is a measure of the total information observed from the previous close to the 
time period k and 

 u
2  is the noise effect observed in prices at interval k. The slope thus 
measures the ratio of information content (signal) to signal plus noise in prices at interval k. 
Specifically, we conduct a time series estimation of Equation (5) for each contract and 
each time period. We obtain the slope coefficient estimates for each contract and calculate the 
mean for all contracts and for each interval. Following Biais et al. (1999) and others
20
, we 
calculate confidence bands using the time series‘ standard errors for the mean of the slope 
coefficient estimates. As pointed out by Biais et al. (1999) time series estimation of 
instrument returns in the presence of learning is problematic as a result of learning-induced 
non-stationarity. This is relevant to our analysis, especially since we analyse learning in the 
after hours market. To ensure that our analysis does not suffer from the spurious regression 
                                                 
20
 See Fama and Macbeth (1973) and Barclay and Hendershott (2003).  
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problem, we conduct individual unit root tests of each time series variable used in the 
separate regressions. The test results suggest that the variables are stationary. To obtain 
robust t-statistics, we apply the Newey and West (1987) heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent covariance (HAC) matrix estimator
21
. The Newey and West (1987) 
HAC is consistent in the presence of both heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown 
form. The results obtained using the HAC estimator are very similar to those obtained using 
only OLS and in some cases have stronger levels of statistical significance for corresponding 
coefficient estimates.        
Figure 3 shows the graph of the mean slope coefficients with the confidence bands. In 
Table 6 are also two panels of the slope estimates for the normal trading day periods and 
AMC periods. Comparatively, the signal: noise ratio in the normal trading day is generally 
lower than the AMC as we hypothesised. During the normal trading day, the signal: noise 
ratio range from about 0.37 to 0.78 and from 0.61 to 0.92 in the AMC, clearly indicating the 
normal trading day as noisier.  Ciccotello and Hatheway (2000) and Barclay and Hendershott 
(2003) find high signal: noise ratios that are sustained through the normal trading day for the 
NASDAQ pre-open in 1996 and 2000 respectively (NASDAQ pre-open in 2000 daily 
averaged more than $2million). Biais et al. (1999) instead find low signal: noise ratio for the 
Paris Bourse that has no official pre-open trading in 1991. Orders are allowed in the pre-open 
but no execution takes place in 1991 on the Paris Bourse, hence no volume is registered 
although the last 10 minutes before the normal trading day begins is the most active period 
for order placement in the day. These facts and our results further confirm the generally held 
view that trading volumes form a vital component of efficient price discovery, especially in 
thin markets like the EU-ETS platforms. Indeed the highest Euro volume trading periods of 
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 The Newey and West (1987) HAC is consistent in the presence of both heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation of unknown form.  
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the day in our sample post the highest signal: noise ratios. The view that trading activity 
informs price discovery is further strengthened by the fact that low signal: noise ratio is more 
likely for the AMC than the normal trading day because of proximity to the market close
22
.  
We conclude that higher euro trading volumes lead to higher price efficiency and that it holds 
more significance in thin markets.    
Also our expectation of the 11:00-13:00hrs period is confirmed. The noisiest point of 
the day according to Figure 3 is at 13:00hrs as a result of the noisiness of price in the less 
liquid contracts (December-2012, December-2011 and December-2010). The December-
2012 contract during this period is a lowly 0.054; underscoring the fact that majority of the 
trades in this contract are very noisy. The estimates suggest that the less liquid a contract is 
on the ECX platform the higher the likelihood of its prices being noisy. The curious case of 
the 11:00-13:00hrs could also be explained as some form of lunch-time effect. The interval 
falls on the period when many traders go away from their desks for lunch in the city of 
London. The noise level and price discovery efficiency on the ECX is however acceptable 
since the December-2009 (the nearest maturity) contract which accounts for more than 
81.65% of all trades in the sample used achieves a very high level of price discovery 
efficiency. 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE] 
The regression estimates for both the normal trading day and the AMC are obtained 
using the same close-close returns and should therefore be correlated. This means the level of 
statistical difference between the AMC and the normal trading day will be biased using the 
time series standard errors in Figure 3. To draw statistical inference on the distinction 
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 Alternate analysis run by Barclay and Hendershott (2003) on the NASDAQ however suggests this is 
unlikely; still it is a possibility that provides an additional basis for our argument on the link between trading 
volume and price discovery efficiency.   
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between the slope coefficients we have to consider this level of contemporaneous correlation. 
We follow Barclay and Hendershott (2003) method of computing for every day the difference 
between the normal trading day and AMC coefficients and employ the standard error of this 
time series to draw inferences on the difference between the two periods. Our results show 
that the signal: noise ratio was significantly higher in the AMC than the normal trading day
23
. 
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
5. Conclusion 
The EU-ETS was developed as the principal policy instrument to achieve the EU‘s 
obligations under the Kyoto protocol.  The scheme has grown to become the world‘s largest 
carbon market and accounted for 96.46% of global allowances trades in 2009
24
. Several other 
industrialised countries that are obliged to reduce their carbon emissions as a result of their 
Kyoto protocol commitments have already developed similar schemes. Considering its 
success so far, it is reasonable to assume that in the event that it occurs, a global mandatory 
carbon cap and trade scheme will be based on the EU-ETS model. If the EU-ETS is to serve 
this purpose, there must be evidence of its efficiency.  
In this paper, we test whether the EU-ETS is efficient by analyzing the association 
between trading volumes of permit contracts in the EU-ETS and their contribution to price 
discovery and informational efficiency, using intraday data. We discover that the more liquid 
permit instruments are, the higher the likelihood they can be traded efficiently. The price 
discovery process for relatively liquid instruments shows levels of efficiency comparable to 
those of traditional financial instruments. This is the case during both the normal trading day 
and AMC periods. This is a strong indication of the level of efficiency and maturity of the 
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 We have not reported these results, but they are available on request. 
24
 This figure is based on value of carbon instruments traded on cap and trade schemes. The total global 
value for this period was $122.8billion. 
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EU-ETS. The efficiency of the EU-ETS can therefore provide a basis for the introduction of a 
global mandatory cap and trade scheme. An important point to note is the higher per minute 
level of euro trading value in the AMC. This as a result of the high concentration of informed 
trades or trades aimed at achieving optimal trading portfolio before the next normal trading 
day session. This is a viable indication of an emerging level of sophistication in this fast 
growing market. For policy makers, this acknowledgement is key as yet another country, 
Australia passes legislation for its ETS. The Australian ETS, when it comes online in 2015, 
will be the second largest in the world.  
Our findings also have implications for practitioners that are associated with the EU-
ETS. For compliance buyers of carbon permits, who must trade in the market or reduce their 
emissions to avoid regulatory penalties, these results improve confidence in the EU-ETS. 
Compliance buyers can develop carbon trading strategies with better understanding of the 
market price evolution. This includes the distinctions between the different carbon futures 
instruments and the different trading periods and intervals. For investors, this study provides 
practical insights that can be useful for carbon investment strategies and effective risk 
management. Investor participation in the market requires the assurance of an appreciable 
level of price signalling. This is vital for efficient allocation of resources. By demonstrating 
that liquid carbon futures enjoy similar level of informational efficiency to traditional 
derivatives, our paper serves this purpose. 
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Table 1 
Phases of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) 
The table compares the three phases of the EU-ETS using regulatory issues as basis of comparison. Phase I spans between 2005 and 2007, Phase II started in 2008 and is 
expected to last till 2012 and Phase III starts in 2013 running untill 2020. 
 
Variables Phase I Phase II Phase III 
Gases targeted CO2 only CO2 only CO2, Perflourocarbons and Nitrous 
Oxide 
Allocation system Allocation based on grandfathering Up to 10% of created permits can be 
auctioned 
20% auctioning in 2013 with a 
gradual rise to 70% in 2020 (For 
power generators, full auctioning 
from 2013) 
Proportion of GHG under scheme 40% 40% 50% 
Banking regulations Intra-phase banking only Inter-phase banking allowed Inter-phase banking 
Allocation Planning National Allocation Plans (NAP) National Allocation Plans (NAP) European Union-wide allocations  
Penalty for default €40 per missing EUA along with the 
submission of the subsequent 
missing EUA. 
€100 per missing EUA along with 
the submission of the subsequent 
missing EUA. 
Initial penalty per missing EUA is 
fitted to the European Price Index. 
The subsequent submission of the 
missing EUA is also expected. 
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Table 2 
Trading summary 
The table gives a summary of trading activities during After Market Closes (AMC) and normal trading day periods for four contracts trading on the European Climate 
Exchange (ECX) platform. The contracts are the highest volume trading ones of the contracts eligible for AMC trading.  The data cover the trading period February 2009 
through November 2009. The table includes estimates for daily average Euro volume, number of contract trades executed per day, average contract volume per day and 
percentage of days with trading for the AMC period. The normal trading day period runs between 7:00hrs and 16:59:59hrs London time; the AMC runs between 17:00hrs and 
18:00hrs London time. 
 
 AMC  Normal Trading Day 
  
Number of 
Trades 
Volume (€ 
‗000) 
Contract 
Volume 
% days 
with 
trading 
  
Number 
of Trades 
Volume (€ 
‗000) 
Contract 
volume 
Dec-09 50.23 25907 1957.07 97.22  1239.61 129263 9775.74 
Dec-10 5.66 4603 328.18 90.28  142.33 46571 1674.24 
Dec-11 1.49 1916 131.03 63.89  52.51 19669 681.29 
Dec-12 3.18 4214 267.79 79.63  84.65 19769 1279.83 
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Figure 1 
Trading Volume and Volatility 
The figure shows average daily trading volume and volatility for every half-hour period of the normal trading day and After Market Closes (AMC) periods for four December 
maturity contracts (2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012) trading on the European Climate Exchange (ECX) platform.  The data cover the trading period February 2009 through 
November 2009. Volatility is computed as the standard deviation of the half-hour contract return and is calculated for the December 2009 contract only due to large gaps in 
trading cycle of other contracts. We calculate volatility using the other contracts as well but excluding their trading gap periods and the results are highly similar. The normal 
trading day period runs between 7:00hrs and 16:59:59hrs London time; the AMC runs between 17:00hrs and 18:00hrs London time. 
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Figure 2 
Log Median and Mean Trade Size 
The figure shows the logarithmic conversion of median and mean trade sizes over the entire trading periods of normal trading day and After Market Closes (AMC) for four 
December maturity contracts (2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012) trading on the European Climate Exchange (ECX) platform.  The data covers the trading period February 2009 
through November 2009. The normal trading day period runs between 7:00hrs and 16:59:59hrs London time; the AMC runs between 17:00hrs and 18:00hrs London time. 
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Table 3 
Information Asymmetry And Half-Spread By Time Interval 
The table shows adverse selection costs components in Panel A and one-half effective spreads in Panel B for the 
four highest volume December maturity contracts on the European Climate Exchange (ECX) platform. Both the 
adverse selection costs components and the one-half spread components are estimated using the following 
contract specific model (Huang and Stoll, 1997):  

Pk,t  1,kQk,t 2,kQk,t1 3,kQA,t1 et  
where 

Pk,t  is the change in price from the previous retained trade, 

Qk,t  is equal to 1 (-1) when the transaction 
at period t for contract c was a sell (buy) and 

QA,t1  is the aggregate buy-sell indicator variable used in 
encapsulating portfolio trading pressure on market participants inventory levels, it equals 1(-1, 0) when the sum 
of 

Qk,t1  across all four contracts is positive (negative, zero). Adverse selection costs component for each 
interval in Panel A is given as: 

2(2,k 1,k)  
One-half effective spread for each interval in Panel B is given as β2,k. Pairwise Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney U tests 
are used to compute p-values for the differences between each of the different contract-dependent normal 
trading day intervals and the AMC period. In both panels, 
#
 denotes the normal trading day intervals during 
which the contract estimates are significantly different from the AMC. In Panel B, * denotes statistical 
significance of the spread estimates at 1% level. The data covers the trading period February 2009 through 
November 2009. The normal trading day period runs between 7:00hrs and 16:59:59hrs London time and the 
AMC runs between 17:00hrs and 18:00hrs London time. 
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Panel A: Adverse selection costs component 
 Time Periods 
 Normal Trading Day AMC 
Contracts 
07:00-
09:00 
09:00-
11:00 
11:00-
13:00 
13:00-
15:00 
15:00-
17:00 
07:00- 
17:00 
17:00-
18:00 
Dec-2009 0.016 0.036 0.012 0.001 0.002 0.014 0.411 
Dec-2010 0.044 0.024 0.024 0.032 0.000 0.022 0.403 
Dec-2011 0.049 0.083 0.047 0.028 0.032 0.053 0.511 
Dec-2012 0.084 0.062 0.058 0.080 0.036 0.063 0.489 
Overall 0.048
#
 0.051
#
 0.035
#
 0.035
#
 0.017
#
 0.038
#
 0.453 
 
 
Panel B: One-half effective spread 
Time periods 
 Normal Trading Day AMC 
Contracts 
7:00- 
9:00 
9:00-
11:00 
11:00-
13:00 
13:00-
15:00 
15:00-
17:00 
07:00- 
17:00 
17:00-
18:00 
Dec-2009 0.026* 0.023* 0.025* 0.017* 0.017* 0.021* 0.235*  
Dec-2010 0.045* 0.025* 0.032* 0.020* 0.018* 0.027* 0.239 * 
Dec-2011 0.050* 0.057* 0.042* 0.038* 0.025* 0.041* 0.324 * 
Dec-2012 0.072* 0.051* 0.083* 0.057* 0.038* 0.056* 0.348 * 
Overall 0.048
#
 0.039
#
 0.045
#
 0.033
#
 0.024
#
 0.036
#
 0.286 
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Table 4 
Weighted Price Contribution by Time Intervals 
The table shows weigthed price contribution (WPC) of six normal trading day intervals and the After Market 
Closes (AMC) period to the close-to-close return for the four highest volume December maturity contracts on 
the European Climate Exchange (ECX) platform. For each contract and interval k the weigthed price 
contribution is computed for each day and then averaged across days: 

WPCk,c 
retc
retcc1
C







retk,c
retc  
Where 

retk,c is the log-return for interval k and for EUA contract c.

retc  is the close-to-close return for contract 
c. The trading days when close-to-close returns equal 0 are eliminated. The final column shows the fraction of 
days with close-to-close return equal to 0. The overall estimate in the final row is the sum of WPC for all 
contracts in that time interval. Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (tie-adjusted) tests are used to determine whether 
contract-dependent values for normal trading day intervals are significantly different from the AMC period. 
#
 
denotes the contract-dependent normal trading day interval during which the contract WPC is significantly 
different from that of the AMC. * indicates the WPC values significantly different from 0 at the 5% level. The 
data covers the trading period February 2009 through November 2009. The normal trading day period runs 
between 7:00hrs and 16:59:59hrs London time; the AMC runs between 17:00hrs and 18:00hrs London time. 
Time Periods   
 Normal Trading Day AMC Days 
with 
zero 
price 
change 
Contracts 
07:00-
09:00 
09:00-
11:00 
11:00-
13:00 
13:00-
15:00 
15:00-
17:00 
07:00-
17:00 
17:00-
18:00 
Dec-2009 -0.006
#
 -0.006 -0.02 -0.034 0.038 -0.028 0.003 0.019 
Dec-2010 0.083*
#
 0.038
#
 -0.027 0.04 0.059*
#
 0.193*
#
 -0.028 0.019 
Dec-2011 0.051 0.015
#
 0.037
#
 0.042 0.084* 0.229* 0.081* 0.024 
Dec-2012 0.084* 0.072* 0.029
#
 0.026
#
 0.109* 0.32* 0.23* 0.019 
Overall 0.212* 0.119 0.019 0.074 0.29*
#
 0.714*
#
 0.286* 0.019 
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Table 5 
Weighted Price Contribution Per Trade by Time Intervals 
The table shows weigthed price contribution per trade (WPCT) of six Regular Trading Hours normal trading 
day intervals and the After Market Closes (AMC) period to the close-to-close return for the four highest volume 
December maturity contracts on the European Climate Exchange (ECX) platform. For each contract and interval 
k the weigthed price contribution per trade is computed for each day and then averaged across days: 

WPCTk,c 
retc
retcc1
C






retk,c
retc 
retc
retcc1
C






tk,c
tc 
, 

tk,c  is the number of executed trades in time interval k for contract c, and 

tc  is the total sum of 

tk,c  for all the 
intervals. The trading days when close-to-close returns equal 0 are eliminated. The final column shows the 
fraction of days with close-to-close return equal to 0. Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (tie-adjusted) tests are used to 
determine whether contract-dependent values for normal trading day intervals are significantly different from 
the AMC period. 
#
 denotes the contract-dependent normal trading day interval during which the contract WPCT 
is significantly different from that of the AMC. * indicates the WPCT values significantly different from 0 at the 
5% level. The data covers the trading period February 2009 through November 2009. The normal trading day 
period runs between 7:00hrs and 16:59:59hrs London time; the AMC runs between 17:00hrs and 18:00hrs 
London time. 
 
 Time Periods 
 Normal Trading Day AMC Days with 
zero price 
change 
Contracts 
07:00-
09:00 
09:00-
11:00 
11:00-
13:00 
13:00-
15:00 
15:00-
17:00 
07:00-
17:00 
17:00-
18:00 
Dec-2009 -0.12
#
 -0.15 -0.57 -0.68 0.63 -0.12 0.31 0.019 
Dec-2010 2.54*
#
 0.76
#
 -0.72 0.86
#
 0.78*
#
 0.80*
#
 -2.90 0.019 
Dec-2011 1.96* 0.33 1.13
#
 0.83
#
 0.92* 0.93* 11.54* 0.024 
Dec-2012 2.78* 1.75* 1.04
#
 0.63
#
 1.10* 1.34* 25.53* 0.019 
Overall 1.79
#
 0.67 0.22 0.41 0.86*
#
 0.74*
#
 8.63* 0.019 
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Figure 3 
Unbiasedness Regressions by intervals 
The figure shows the chart of signal:noise ratio over the entire trading periods of normal trading day and After Market Closes (AMC) for the December maturity contracts 
(2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012) trading on the European Climate Exchange (ECX) platform.   For each contract and each day, the following Equation is estimated separately for 
each time period (60 minutes each for the normal trading day and 10 minutes for the AMC), where 

retcc  is the close to close return and 

retck  is the return from the close to 
the end time of period k. Confidence bands are computed using the time series‘ standard errors of the slope coefficient estimates. 

retcc  retck k  
The data covers the trading period February 2009 through November 2009. The normal trading day period runs between 7:00hrs and 16:59:59hrs London time; the 
AMC runs between 17:00hrs and 18:00hrs London time. 
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Table 6 
Unbiasedness Regressions by intervals 
The table shows results of signal:noise ratio over the entire trading periods of normal trading day (Panel A) and After Market Closes (AMC) (Panel B) for the December 
maturity contracts (2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012) trading on the European Climate Exchange (ECX) platform.   For each contract and each day, the following Equation is 
estimated separately for each time period (60 minutes each for the normal trading day and 10 minutes for the AMC), where 

retcc  is the close to close return and 

retck  is the 
return from the close to the end time of period k.  
 

retcc  retck k  
 
***, **, * denote the statistical significance of the coefficient estimates at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The last row shows the plotted mean coefficient estimates for 
the contracts. The data covers the trading period February 2009 through November 2009. The normal trading day period runs between 7:00hrs and 16:59:59hrs London time; 
the AMC runs between 17:00hrs and 18:00hrs London time. 
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Panel A: Normal Trading Day 
Contracts   08:00 09:00 10:00 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00 17:00 
Dec-2009 
Coefficient  
Std Error  
Adj. R
2
 
0.85*** 
0.099        
0.26 
0.98*** 
0.082   
0.41  
0.75*** 
0.082    
0.28 
0.66*** 
0.081    
0.24 
1.01*** 
0.067 
0.50 
0.84*** 
0.066 
0.44 
0.71*** 
0.052 
0.47 
0.94*** 
0.044 
0.69 
0.85*** 
0.047 
0.61 
0.94*** 
0.024   
0.88 
Dec-2010 
Coefficient  
Std Error  
Adj. R
2
 
0.37*** 
0.086    
0.10 
0.82*** 
0.080 
0.33 
0.83*** 
0.061 
0.47 
0.80*** 
0.068   
0.40 
0.76*** 
0.068   
0.37 
0.36*** 
0.067    
0.12 
0.72*** 
0.059 
0.42 
0.86*** 
0.053 
0.56 
0.91*** 
0.031 
0.80 
0.86*** 
0.034   
0.75 
Dec-2011 
Coefficient  
Std Error  
Adj. R
2
 
0.09* 
0.049        
0.01 
0.20*** 
0.063    
0.04 
0.38*** 
0.074    
0.11 
0.71*** 
0.064   
0.36  
0.37*** 
0.065    
0.13 
0.21*** 
0.061    
0.05 
0.42*** 
0.062    
0.17 
0.98*** 
0.044 
0.70 
0.97*** 
0.040    
0.74 
0.63*** 
0.056   
0.38 
Dec-2012 
Coefficient  
Std Error  
Adj. R
2
 
0.20*** 
0.043    
0.09 
0.12* 
0.065    
0.01 
0.03** 
0.0169    
0.14 
0.65*** 
0.067    
0.31 
0.21*** 
0.063    
0.05 
0.05 
0.064         
-0.0014 
0.55*** 
0.057    
0.31 
0.31*** 
0.059    
0.11 
0.39*** 
0.059    
0.17  
0.63*** 
0.059 
0.35 
Overall  
(Mean Coefficients) 
0.38 0.53 0.50 0.71 0.59 0.37 0.60 0.77 0.78 0.76 
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Panel B: AMC 
Contracts   17:10 17:20 17:30 17:40 17:50 18:00 
Dec-2009 
Coefficient  
Std Error  
Adj. R
2
 
0.87***  
0.065  
0.46 
0.98***  
0.047  
0.68 
1.51***  
0.043   
 0.74 
0.94***  
0.048  
  0.64 
0.91***  
0.046     
  0.65 
0.85***  
0.054  
0.54 
Dec-2010 
Coefficient  
Std Error  
Adj. R
2
 
0.85***  
0.068  
0.68 
0.67***  
0.054  
0.60  
0.67***  
0.076     
0.42 
0.78***  
0.086     
0.45 
0.67*** 
0.087     
0.37 
0.88*** 
0.075        
0.65 
Dec-2011 
Coefficient  
Std Error  
Adj. R
2
 
0.95*** 
0.170    
0.48 
0.47***  
0.083     
0.49 
0.85*** 
0.120     
   0.58 
0.93*** 
0.071  
 0.83 
0.70*** 
0.172       
  0.30 
1.07*** 
0.067     
 0.92 
Dec-2012 
Estimate  
Std Error  
Adj. R
2
 
0.83*** 
0.093       
0.58 
0.32*** 
0.082        
0.18 
0.68*** 
0.082         
0.51 
0.54*** 
0.084       
0.37 
0.63*** 
0.077     
0.47 
0.87*** 
0.089     
0.68 
Overall  
(Mean Coefficients) 
0.87 0.61 0.93 0.80 0.73 0.92 
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Appendix 
 
ECX EUA Futures Contract specification 
Unit of Trading One lot of 1,000 emission allowances (i.e. 1,000 tonnes of 
CO2) 
Quotation Euro (€) and Euro cent (c) per metric tone 
Tick €0.01 
Contract months Contracts are listed on a quarterly expiry cycle such that 
March, June, September and December contract months are 
listed up to December 2012  (Annual contracts with December 
expiries for 2013 and 2014 as well as March 2013 are 
available for only EUA contracts) 
Contract security ICE CLEAR EUROPE guarantees the financial performance 
of ICE Futures Europe contracts registered in the name of its 
members 
Trading system Trading will occur on the ICE Futures Europe platform 
accessible via Web ICE, or through a conformed Independent 
Software Vendor 
Trading model Continuous trading between 07:00 hours to 17:00 hours UK 
local time 
Settlement Prices Trade weighted average during the daily closing period with 
Quoted Settlement Prices if low liquidity 
Delivery The Contracts are physically deliverable by the transfer of 
emissions allowances. There is a delivery period of 3 days 
after the last day of trading 
 
 
 
 
 
 
